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PLAYING ON UNCLE SAM ’S TEAM: AMERICAN
CHILDHOODS DURING WORLD WAR I
If World War I has interested historians of the United States considerably less than other major
wars, it is also true that children rank among the most neglected actors in the literature that
exists on the topic. This essay challenges this limited understanding of the roles children and ado-
lescents played in this transformative period by highlighting their importance in three different
realms. It shows how childhood emerged as a contested resource in prewar debates over militarist
versus pacifist education; examines the affective power of images of children—American as well as
foreign—in U.S. wartime propaganda; and maps various social arenas in which the young engaged
with the war on their own account. While constructions of childhood and youth as universally valid
physical and developmental categories gained greater currency in the early twentieth century,
investigations of young people in wartime reveal how much the realities of childhood and youth
differed according to gender, class, race, region, and age.
On October 18, 1917, a shot rang out in the Wilmote home at Pulvers Corner in Pough-
keepsie, New York. Eight-year-old Wilber Wilmote had told his thirteen-year-old sister
Mary to be a German soldier, and that he would drive her out of the trenches. Wilber then
ran to the corner of the kitchen; grabbed his father’s shotgun, which he thought was
unloaded, and pulled the trigger. Mary, who stood just ten feet away, was hit in the
chest and died four hours later.1 Poughkeepsie was no exception. Judging by several
newspaper reports, accidental shootings in the United States spiked in the months follow-
ing the country’s entry into World War I. Many of these shootings involved children. As
an increasing number of war games between minors turned deadly, they posed hard ques-
tions that contemporary Americans were reluctant to ponder. What does it take for a
young person growing up in times of war to become a killer? Can a child be enthusiastic
about war and remain innocent at the same time?
When we are confronted with images of children devastated by war and the cultures of
violence it breeds, our hearts go out to them. The extent to which human beings are inher-
ently disposed or culturally programmed to empathize with children is perhaps impossi-
ble to determine. But there is little doubt that the civilian casualties caused by modern
warfare have solidified the notion of children as archetypal victims. The figure of the
child brutalized by armed conflict ranks among the most powerful and emotionally
charged tropes of our time.
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Children die, lose their homes, and are separated from their families in war. And yet,
this narrative obscures as much as it reveals. Children’s responses to war were far more
complex than the association of childhood and victimhood suggests. The young did not
remain passive bystanders; they absorbed the politics that led to war, exploited the some-
times jarring freedoms offered in wartime, and made the experience of war their own.2
Given the lack of children’s voices in historical sources, the quest to ascribe agency to
young people can be taxing and treacherous, and focusing exclusively on instances of
resistance can lead historians into what Mona Gleason called the “agency trap.”3 To
avoid this trap, Susan Miller suggested that we think of children’s actions as moving
on a continuum “from opposition to assent.”4 War makes for a particularly fertile site
to test this continuum and identify the points at which the interests of children aligned
with or departed from adult agendas.
Using America’s role in World War I as an example, this article examines the demo-
graphic and symbolic capital modern societies attached to children in war.5 Too often
historians have seemed unwilling to reflect on the tremendous power vested in children.
This reluctance might stem from the perceived “softness” of childhood studies, which
dissuades scholars from making big claims about children and youth. Studying children,
however, is not about counting dolls and diapers. Fusing the histories of war and child-
hood can help us appreciate the multiple and diverse roles played by society’s youngest
members in wartime. It can provide fresh insights into how interacting with children in
times of national crisis prompted adults to reaffirm the norms and ideals to which they,
consciously or subconsciously, adhered. And it can raise awareness of how children
functioned as “innocent weapons,” enabling actors of varied persuasions to impose
moral clarity on a messy reality.6
Let me clarify my use of terminology. This article defines childhood broadly. It seeks
to include the lives of young people from toddlerhood through adolescence as they
acquired visibility and meaning in a world at war. This wide lens allows us to see how
war pushed societies to rethink the relationship of age and citizenship and renegotiate
transition points on the developmental trajectory from childhood to adulthood. Early
twentieth-century associations of youth with vitality and dynamism set adolescents
apart from children, yet both childhood and youth became powerful metaphors that con-
nected references to an idyllic past with visions of either glorious or gloomy national and
international futures.
The historian Tara Zahra astutely called childhood a “deceptively universal concept.”7
It is universal in the sense that we draw certainty about what constitutes childhood from
the biological fact that everybody is conditioned to grow from infancy to adulthood. At
the same time, individual experiences of childhood, as well as the question who counted
as a child, depended heavily on age, gender, class, race, religion, and state politics, but
also on when and where a person was young. Given their geographical distance from
and the late entry of the United States into the war, American children were never
impacted to the same degree as their European peers. Disruption of home life and school-
ing, absent fathers, hunger, and the deaths of family and friends in combat and through
starvation remained less frequent. And yet, there are important lessons to be learned from
how American children of various backgrounds moved—sometimes playfully, some-
times fearfully—on the shifting terrains of nation, war, and international engagement.
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When pondering these lessons, it is equally important to reflect on how representations of
children were complicit in shaping adult attitudes toward the war.
No analysis of the intergenerational spaces occupied by American children and their
adult supervisors during World War I would be fully satisfying without surveying
prewar conditions. This is why the following section offers an overview of the contested
role of war in early twentieth-century children’s upbringing. It focuses in particular on the
rise of peace education initiatives in Europe and North America that sought to reverse the
tendency in schools to indoctrinate youth into amilitarized nationalism.After this prelude,
the article turns to the affective power of U.S.-produced war posters published after 1914
that depicted childhood suffering and youthful patriotism, which served to discredit the
pacifist notion that initiating children into the world of war was utterly immoral. The
third section then delves into children’s involvement in the U.S. war effort. Rather than
making young Americans appear as passive subordinates, this part reveals that the child-
ren’s actions in support of (or opposition to) the war reflected larger social divisions as
well as conflicting expectations with regard to the proper place of children in times of war.
EDUCAT ION IN PEACE AND WAR
By November 1914, the reformer and peace educator Fannie Fern Andrews had given up
hope that America’s children could be shielded from the bloodshed that proceeded apace
on the other side of the Atlantic. Having toured classrooms all over the country, Andrews
found the war to be “the subject of supreme moment.” Like their elders, “the children…
eagerly watch the newspapers, scan the war maps, listen to heated discussions, and form
what may or may not be correct opinions.”As the founder of the American School Peace
League, which had begun to circulate pacifist literature for high school students in
concert with the U.S. Bureau of Education as early as 1912, Andrews dreaded the barba-
rizing impact of war on young minds. But she also saw its inescapability as an opportu-
nity to advance her cause. Instead of fanning the flames of partisanship, America’s
teachers should lead “every boy and girl” to “look upon this spectacle of human suffering
and devastation with horror” and take “an interest in the movement which shall bring
about the reign of law in place of the reign of the sword.”8
Split over how to respond to an international crisis that had descended into carnage,
Andrews and her compatriots were also struggling over the kind of civic virtues that
should guide the education of young people growing up in a world at war. Tensions
over the best way to prepare children for future conflict while preserving childhood inno-
cence were especially evident in clashes between war pedagogues and peace educators
after 1900. These clashes played out transnationally but assumed a peculiar character
in the United States, where the Prussian model of mass conscription was absent and inva-
sion fears were ephemeral due to the country’s geographical location. Peace educators
thrived in an environment that regarded schools as the principal means to advocate
social justice at home and international understanding abroad. Progressive Era reformers
such as Jane Addams and John Dewey joined Andrews in challenging traditional curric-
ula that celebrated martial valor and sacrifice. Teaching children to avoid war, according
to Dewey, was the pinnacle of democratic citizenship since it reconciled instilling in the
young “national loyalty” and “patriotism” with “superior devotion to the things which
unite men … irrespective of national political boundaries.”9
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With the expansion of the public school system in early twentieth-century America,
schoolteachers assumed new importance when it came to convincing the young of the
righteousness, or alternatively the folly, of war. As Susan Zeiger has argued, the fact
that female teachers were overrepresented in Progressive Era campaigns to merge
civic and peace education proved to be at once a blessing and a curse.10 Organizations
such as the American School Peace League (ASPL), founded in Boston in 1908,
strengthened the ties between white middle-class teachers-turned-reformers working in
the fields of education, pacifism, and women’s suffrage and added to their public visibil-
ity. Unlike their Victorian Era predecessors, female activist teachers claimed to protect
children from the horrors of war as public servants, not as mothers. In guiding children
toward peace and brotherhood, however, these pedagogues faced accusations from con-
servative educators that by replacing stories of hypermasculine warriors with those of
empathetic and nurturing men and women, they were creating feminized boys, not
better citizens. The pressure for political conformity mounted in the aftermath of the
U.S. declaration of war in April 1917. Denounced by their own students, pacifist teachers
were harassed and fired. Acting out of self-preservation, Andrews and her coworker Ella
Lyman Cabot called on like-mined teachers to shift gears and impart lessons of Anglo-
American moral superiority.11
When objecting to raising the nation’s children to admire soldiers and generals, peace
educators were battling a tendency, not so much a state-sponsored scheme. War peda-
gogy did not exist in the United States as a formalized movement as it did in wartime
Germany, but was rather the aggregate of a diverse set of cultural traditions, social exper-
iments, and local grassroots initiatives.12 In a society that cared more about solving the
problems caused by industrialization, urbanization, and mass immigration than national
security issues, official efforts to militarize youth were limited. School cadet corps and
boys’ drill companies, which were promoted by members of the armed forces since
the late nineteenth century, failed to catch on beyond a few high schools and universities.
In places where volunteer military training camps attracted adolescent boys and college-
aged young men, the daily routines of marching long hours and preparing for imaginary
attacks bred boredom. Many boys left without graduating.13 The proponents of national
preparedness, who reached a wider audience after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe,
also accomplished relatively little in terms of persuading young Americans to acquaint
themselves with the basics of military training. Although Theodore Roosevelt and
Leonard Wood—to name just two leading advocates of preparedness—argued that
their movement infused patriotism in youths of all classes and backgrounds, its white
middle-class orientation bore little resemblance to the experiences of children brought
up outside the social confines of that group.14
It would be fallacious, however, to mistake the ineffectiveness of top-down militariza-
tion schemes for the absence of military values in American children’s lives prior to
1917. The nation’s popular culture was awash with references to past examples of
martial glory. Learning about America’s war heroes from George Washington and
Andrew Jackson to Theodore Roosevelt, saluting the flag, and reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance at the beginning of each school day became mandatory parts in the instruction
of young Americans. Even educators whomight have felt uneasy about teaching students
that the paramount duty of a citizen was to fight for his country were likely convinced that
they were inculcating proper gender ideals. Boys in particular were expected to act out
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aggressive impulses in team sports, get rough and dirty in the outdoors, and read juvenile
novels with a healthy dose of frontier violence to offset the potentially feminizing influ-
ences of church and home.15 In addition, newer theories of adolescence and masculinity,
which arose from fears that young American males influenced by women and the com-
forts of modernity would grow up soft and weak, inspired a host of patriotic youth orga-
nizations that wanted to help boys acquire manly character and self-reliance. Preparing
boys for social leadership roles was the stated rationale of the Boy Scouts of America
(BSA). One of the more successful masculinization endeavors of the time, the Boy
Scouts appealed primarily to boys and men from white, middle-class, and Protestant
backgrounds and drew the support of a broad coalition of business, military, and political
leaders. Though advertised as a nonmilitary venture, the BSA introduced army-style
ranks, grouped boys into “troops,” made them wear uniforms, and taught them to
honor the Stars and Stripes.16
The ambivalent attitude of the BSA toward war exemplified broader uncertainties
about the extent to which American children and adolescents should be raised as
citizen-soldiers. While peace educators may have overstated the dangers of formal mil-
itary instruction, they knew that a romantic understanding of war could always lurk
behind the virtues of obedience, service, courage and loyalty that pervaded children’s
culture in the early twentieth century, especially (but not exclusively) in its white
middle-class variant. The United States, thus, approached World War I with a bifurcated
image of the child: one that radiated precious innocence and vulnerability but also
embodied an archaic will to fight.
CH ILDREN IN WAR PROPAGANDA
While the battlefields of World War I were trembling under the detonation of shells and
grenades, the societies involved in the conflict witnessed an explosion of visual culture.
Photography and motion film epitomized the modernity of the war, yet it was the poster
that became the favored propaganda tool of the period. Easy to produce and easier to dis-
tribute, war posters reached masses of people in every major combatant nation. Posters
drawn up by advertisers and government officials were glued to factory walls, shop
windows, streetcars, bus stops, schools, and were reproduced in newspapers as part of
a larger effort to mobilize civilian populations and meld them into an imagined home
front. Images of children figured regularly in that effort.
Civic organizations such as the Red Cross or the YMCA recruited artists to produce
patriotic posters of their own, yet their output was miniscule compared to the muscle
the U.S. government put behind distributing what they considered a proven visual
method with the help of some of the nation’s finest illustrators. By the end of the war,
the War Department alone had printed more than four million posters.17 Leading the
effort was George Creel’s Committee on Public Information (CPI), installed by President
Wilson in April 1917 to sway public opinion in favor of the war. “People might choose
not to attend meetings or to watch motion pictures,” Creel allegedly said, “but the bill-
board was something that caught even the most indifferent eye.”18 Cognizant of child-
hood’s sentimental power, Creel had made his mark in the early 1910s as a crusader
against child labor and abuse.19 Responding to Wilson’s call to arms, Creel partnered
with the most famous American illustrator of the period, Charles Dana Gibson, to sell
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key messages about the war. This included playing on understandings of children as
embodiments of pure morality and of undeserved suffering.
My analysis of the visual rhetoric of childhood in U.S. propaganda duringWorldWar I
is based on a digitized sample of 774 posters made available through the Library of Con-
gress (LoC). Of these 774 posters, roughly one-tenth, that is, 71, foreground children in
various war-related contexts. In general terms, these representations can be subsumed
under the rubric of one (or a mixture) of two pictorial types—the figure of the victimized
and the patriotic child.20 A detailed reading of three posters included in the LoC collec-
tion will highlight major themes and contexts—from long-distance empathy to the mobi-
lizing power of exemplary conduct—where the propagandistic use of children had the
biggest effect.
What was the purpose of posters that cast children as the quintessential victims of war?
How was that victimhood depicted? One poster, issued in May 1917 by the American
Red Cross on behalf of the American Fund for French Wounded, an organization run
by American women living overseas to aid wounded Allied soldiers, shows a nurse sur-
rounded by destitute young children, some with French flags, as a woman on her knees
hands the nurse an infant. The poster’s caption “Motherless, Fatherless, Starving—How
Much to Save These Little Lives?” is a poignant call for intervention on behalf of the suf-
fering children of one of America’s key allies.21 Together with a host of other posters that
center on imperiled French, Belgian, and Serbian children, the illustration blends the dis-
courses of child saving and humanitarianism. It taps into what gender studies scholar
Laura Briggs called “the visual iconography of rescue,” one that provided a corridor
for adult Americans to imagine the problems of the needy and position themselves as
their champion.22 In focusing on age rather than gender, the poster portrays violence
against children as the ultimate crime. By extension, it confers a special kind of nobility
to those willing to punish the enemy for his transgressions against the helpless. Righteous
anger over the mistreatment of foreign children forged transatlantic bonds of affection
and became a crucial emotional corollary to presenting the war against Germany as a
conflict between civilization and barbarism.
Like all sensations, anger can be a fleeting emotion that needs constant jolts and shocks
to transform momentary irritation into a prolonged sense of indignation. A chief function
of war propaganda was to trigger such impulses, to intensify one’s identification with the
ongoing war effort, and to stun the public with evermore frightening representations of
the enemy’s capacity for evil. As the anti-German propaganda campaign escalated in the
United States, the depictions of children brutalized by the German war machine became
more gruesome. An unsparingly gory image first shown in a 1915 edition of the weekly
magazine Life reappeared at the height of the Third Liberty Loan Campaign in April
1918: it depicted a German soldier parading with toddlers and babies impaled on his
bloodied bayonet.23 It is probably impossible to know whether such illustrations made
any difference in terms of swaying more Americans to open their wallets for the war
effort, but it is equally conceivable that the constant barrage of violent images had the
contradictory effect of desensitizing their intended audience to the horrors of warfare.
A far less grisly poster created by the illustrator Herbert Andrew Paus, who was a
member of the CPI-led Division of Pictorial Publicity, and published in early 1918 by
the U.S. Treasury Department suggested that the war also posed a threat to America’s
children. Urging citizens to buy war saving stamps, the poster depicts a nude child
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standing next to the arm of the Statue of Liberty. The accompanying caption reads “Save
Your Child from Poverty and Autocracy.”24 The figure of the naked child serves as an
allegory for the vulnerable nation. Ensuring the survival of children, it seemed to say,
was a responsibility to be shouldered by soldiers and parents alike. Child-centered pro-
paganda resonated with pronatalist discourses, which held that the nation’s biological
survival demanded producing and protecting innocent children. Making the world safe
for democracy and a safe place for children to grow up appeared as identical priorities.
Representations of patriotic children were just as commonly used to rally Americans
behind the war effort. Remarkably, no child was found too young to play on Uncle Sam’s
Team. As one poster commissioned by the U.S. Food Administration in May 1917 and
completed by the Massachusetts-born painter Charles Cushman Parker implied, even
toddlers were supposed to “do [their] bit” by eating oatmeal and saving wheat for the sol-
diers.25 Food and patriotism also converged in posters that encouraged children and ado-
lescents to join voluntary youth organizations such as the Junior Red Cross, the Boy
Scouts, and the U.S. School Garden Army. These illustrations spoke to minors as
much as they did to adults. The idea was that if kids could lend their time and enthusiasm
to winning the war, so could the grown-ups.
In addition to presenting children as model citizens, these posters are interesting for the
countervailing tendencies they reveal. One major tension concerns the paradox of child-
hood in the age of total war, a time when societies claimed to uphold the ideal of child-
hood as a sheltered space of existence even as they accepted the need to mobilize children
for war.WorldWar I Americans grappling with this paradox responded by paying greater
attention to age, especially by slicing up childhood and youth into smaller cohorts to
define age- and gender-appropriate spheres of involvement. Proper home-front activities
ranged from eating properly for preschoolers and saving quarters for war stamps for ele-
mentary schoolchildren to gardening for older girls and premilitary training for adoles-
cent boys.
At the same time, these images tell us a lot about the universalist pretensions of
Western constructions of childhood, and the ways in which these constructions denied
difference. Of all 71 posters in my pool, only one shows a child of a darker complexion.
Even those posters that highlight youngsters in regions of the world where whites were in
the minority cast their protagonists in Caucasian features. The artists may have felt this
was the best way to foster feelings of solidarity between a white middle-class viewership
and their objects. Yet this mode of representation also solidified whiteness as the norm of
what it meant to be young and endangered in times of war. The motif of the white child
inserted a biopolitical as well as moral component into official U.S. war propaganda: it
hid the nation’s white supremacist past, present, and possible future behind a racialized
notion of childhood innocence while projecting vice and guilt on its adversaries.26
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the whitening of war childhoods was not con-
sciously rooted in a viciously racist plot. For many internationally minded Americans
of the World War I period, universalizing the trope of the endangered white child consti-
tuted a critical link connecting domestic Progressive Era discourses of child saving to the
nascent field of international child rescue. The Near East Relief program, which coordi-
nated American efforts to provide food and shelter for survivors of the Armenian geno-
cide, illustrates this. The prewar advertising industry had already conditioned Americans
to see white, big-eyed children as epitomes of beauty and purity when representations of
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surprisingly light-skinned Armenian boys and girls were tugging at the heartstrings of
potential donors.27 Protestant missionaries and philanthropists who formed the backbone
of the Near East Relief prompted the country to action by emphasizing the religious iden-
tity of the Armenians as “ancient Christians.” At the same time, they made sure that con-
temporary racializations of the latter that grouped them as either part of the Caucasian or
Oriental “races” would tip in the direction of the former collective.28
The men and women who ran the fundraising operations campaigns by the Near East
Relief and similar humanitarian campaigns certainly understood the selfish elements that
drove national and international politics. Yet they were equally adept at using children to
convey the notion that America wielded its power for spiritual and moral fulfillment.
These ideological projections, of course, were not about children “as they were,” or
the multiple ways in which young Americans engaged with the war on their terms.
The following section offers a glimpse into how the politics of gender, age, class, and
race shaped U.S. children’s responses to the war, individually as well as collectively.
CH ILDREN AS ACTORS
Despite their sloganesque nature, displays of youthful jingoism accessed a simple reality:
American children did turn out in throngs to support the war. They promotedWar Saving
Stamps and Liberty Bond programs, collected scrap metals and other materials that could
be used for the war effort, participated in patriotic gatherings, and cheered the soldiers as
they departed for Europe. To march behind the “martial music,” one Boy Scout remarked
in October 1918, was “a grand and glorious feeling” and “made us feel like really and
truly soldiers.”29 Parents and teachers who were quick to recognize that the young
greeted Uncle Sam’s call to arms with fervor equal to that of their elders met the children
halfway. Youth organizations in particular, many of which expanded in the superpatriotic
climate of 1917 and 1918, rendered visible and gave structure to young people’s desire to
become involved while promising that children and youths would act within larger adult-
formulated paradigms.
The concurrent growth of the BSA and their female counterparts, the Girl Scouts of
America (GSA), suggests the manifold ways in which Americans, not unlike their Euro-
pean contemporaries, had come to accept the potency of children mobilized for war.30 To
be sure, this faith in the semi-military and political productivity of the young was heavily
inflected by gender. Not only did the BSA and GSA remain strictly separate organiza-
tions; their respective ideals of young masculinity and femininity also circumscribed
the war-related tasks performed by their members. In the case of the Girl Scouts, the
emphasis on asserting a girl’s right to participate in public affairs while teaching them
traditional domestic skills pushed young females toward a particular set of activities.
By plowing victory gardens, assisting overworked nurses, and volunteering at Red
Cross sewing rooms, girls could show their patriotism without facing charges of crossing
gender lines and “imitating” boys.31 Fears that the instability of war might destabilize the
gender order surfaced in Boy Scouting as well. If making boys into men involved the
possibility of making soldiers, it seemed only plausible that the BSA adapted to
wartime exigencies by developing something akin to a premilitary apprenticeship
program. Unlike girls, boys in scout uniforms served as dispatch bearers, organized
patrols to watch for enemy ships, burned German-language newspapers, and followed
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orders to look for treasonous conduct in their communities. A scheme to have Boy Scouts
tend gardens similar to the one developed by the GSAmet with less enthusiasm, probably
because boys longed for more manly assignments.32
Beyond swelling the ranks of organized youth groups, the war put an indelible stamp
on children’s culture. Twomonths after the Armistice, journalist FlorenceWoolston pub-
lished an article in which she describes how the war had changed her then twelve-year-
old nephew Billy, who grew up in a “one hundred percent patriotic” suburb of NewYork.
With his friends, Billy participated in several scrap drives and fundraising efforts but also
stood at street corners to monitor the traffic on gasoline-less Sundays, throwing pebbles
and yelling “O you Slacker!” at drivers whose cars did not brandish a doctor’s or military
sign. Hurling the insult “You Kaiser!” at another boy was enough to start a schoolyard
brawl, and the games Billy and his friends played were interspersed with military vocab-
ulary: they called their school “the trench,” they went “over the top,” they waged mock
battles in dugouts, “carried kits, ate mess, and had elaborate systems of wig-wagging and
passwords.”When his parents intervened and called him back home, Billy threw up his
hands and cried, “I surrender!” Much of Billy’s war diet, Woolston, speculates, must
have come from watching anti-German movies such as Wolves of Kultur (1918) or
weekly newsreels where actual battle scenes were shown.33
One can justifiably question whether the mobilization of children had any discernible
effect on the nation’s fighting power, yet opinion makers and political leaders never grew
tired of underlining the value of the young as symbols of untainted patriotism. Woodrow
Wilson, for one, extolled the BSA for setting a splendid example of how to train the
nation’s boys to assume the responsibility of maintaining America’s “ideals, her stan-
dards and her influence in the world.”34 Just below the surface of this high idealism,
however, lurked concerns that Americans shared with other advanced nations at war.
With fathers joining the army and the disintegration of prewar family routines, anxieties
about juvenile delinquency rose sharply. Images of street ruffians and vagabond
kids became more frequent in newspapers, as did reports about spikes in youth
crime. More girls were caught shoplifting, while boys were brought into court for
stealing food and clothing from railroad cars. Sexual morals loosened, much to the
chagrin of one Chicago judge, who attributed the “increase in immorality” largely to
the “adoration in which young girls hold soldiers and sailors.”35 As the sociologist
Winthrop D. Lane soberly concluded in the summer of 1917, “already probation officers
in New York City are reporting an increase in the number of juvenile offenders … and
this is attributed by the officers themselves to the unsettlement of life and thought caused
by the war.”36 Clearly, where some praised the young as model warriors, others
warned that the breakdown of peacetime restraints generated opportunities for
misapplied energy.
War work for underage Americans served the dual tasks of inspiring adults and disci-
plining the young. Admittedly, this statement is painted with a rather broad brush, and
every analysis has to be mindful of the local circumstances that decided whether children
wound up as willing executioners of adult designs or as subversive actors. Generally,
through, young people refused to be mere pawns in the hands of their elders. If adults
were not worried about adolescent recaltricance, they expressed astonishment at just
how aggressive the youngest members of society could be in coping with the situation
that their country had gone to war through improvised play (at times with deadly
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results, as the case of the Wilmote children shows). A burgeoning war toy industry
opened up new possibilities for children looking for ways to process their confusion
and release their anger—to the chagrin of progressive educators who regarded the war
as a bad influence on impressionable young minds. “The boys who were killing now
were seven, eight, nine, and ten then,” explained the American psychologist
A. A. Brill, who was grappling with the mounting homicide rates of the postwar
period. “They waged mimic wars with tin soldiers and they chose for hero-worship
the man who had brought down 15 enemy planes, who had bayoneted 20 foemen in a
bull rush across to the waiting trench. One inhibition was swept away. …”37
Young people’s dreams of achieving glory coexisted uneasily with the rules and
restrictions imposed upon them in other places as well. Just two weeks after the
United States had declared war on Germany, two rivaling American Scout organiza-
tions—the BSA and a much smaller and short-lived association that called itself the
“United States Boy Scouts”—found themselves at the center of a national debate over
the ethics of child mobilization in a democracy. Parents and educators were outraged
after reading reports that a contingent of United States Boy Scouts in Bridgeport, Con-
necticut, had been patrolling the streets of their community armed with rifles. BSA orga-
nizers scrambled to repair the damage, stating that their program did “not put the idea of
killing into the minds of [our boys]… Uncle Sam does not want boy soldiers.”38 While
adult leaders in the Boy Scouts of America were busy fending off charges of militarism,
the boys responded quite differently to the situation. After being told to continue their
drills with wooden poles instead of guns, the enthusiasm of a BSA troop in Memphis,
Tennessee, waned. “That kind of put a damper on it,” one of the boys remembered,
“We didn’t like it because [people] called us wooden soldiers.”39 The rifle controversy
shows that the ambitions of young and old with regard to the place of minors in war
did not always march in lockstep. In fact, it suggests that the same sense of service
that adults wanted to spark in children proved the most difficult to control, especially
in circumstances when young people “acted up” or treated the war as a fast track to
the privileges of adulthood.
Underage soldiering was the most glaring, yet least talked about, manifestation of how
children defied the rules of the adult world when it came to their roles in war. The U.S.
Army and Navy pledged that they would enforce their minimum age requirements of
eighteen, but (though there are no reliable figures how many) a number of boys were
eager to join the fight—so eager that they lied about their age. One youngster who
was accepted into service was fourteen-year-old Mike Mansfield, who later represented
Montana in the U.S. Senate. The 5-foot, 4-inch tall Mansfield ran away from home,
altered his birth certificate, and went on several transatlantic escort missions with the
USS Minneapolis.40 The existence of boy soldiers like Mansfield was riddled with
ambivalence—for some, they reflected an older ideal of heroic sacrifice; for others,
they represented the failure of the state to defend the modern ideal of a protected
childhood.
Expectations with regard to a proper wartime childhood were bypassed in yet another
way during a parade that took place in New York on July 28, 1917. There were no loud
cheers, no patriotic banners, only muffled drumbeats to be heard at this “silent parade.”
Black activists headed a procession of up to ten thousand African Americans who,
instead of voicing their support for the war, had come out to protest lynching and anti-
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black violence. A few hundred black children had joined the march, clad in white and
carrying signs reading “Mother, do lynchers go to heaven?” and “Mr. President, why
not make America safe for democracy?”41 It is unlikely that these children had turned
their bodies into sites of political dissent entirely of their own volition, yet their presence
added an increased sense of urgency to the protest. Leading off with children was an act
of demographic resistance, allowing the African Americans to highlight their vulnerabil-
ity as well as their determination to survive as a race. Moreover, by applying Wilson’s
famous slogan to U.S. race relations, the protesters exposed the double standard of a
society that empathized with foreign children tormented by German militarism while
failing to speak out when black children had become the victims of colonialism and
racism. Why play on Uncle Sam’s Team if Uncle Sam wasn’t playing for you?
African American youths, too, had enlisted in a war, but it was a war fought with different
weapons against a different enemy.
Survival and adaptation also became the watchwords for young Americans whose
background marked them as suspicious, if not outright hostile, in the eyes of the
Anglo-Saxon mainstream. Despite their age, children who identified with their
parents’ German American heritage found themselves subject to reproof by civic
actors and state authorities. This may come as no surprise, but the anti-German passions
of 1917 and 1918 that, among other things, led to the prohibition of teaching German in
schools left German American children potentially traumatized, demonstrating that the
realities of wartime childhood were divided by not just by gender, race, and class, but
by ethnicity as well. Anecdotal evidence suggests that while some youths refused to
disown their culture at their own peril, others suffered from the irresponsible behavior
of their parents who were willing to put their children at risk as they resisted wartime
Americanization efforts. In Illinois, one seventeen-year-old German American girl was
kicked out of school because she would not stand up and sing “America the Beautiful.”
Reportedly, she had followed the advice of her parents.42 A Bohemian-born mother of
five in Chicago deflected criticism that she was not loyal to the Stars and Stripes by point-
ing to the patriotic service of her children, true or not.43 Even as the attacks on children in
the United States never reached the atrocious levels common to war zones in Europe and
the Near East, they indicate just how selectively ideals and ideas about childhood were
applied in times of war. With the model of a protected childhood available to only a
certain segment of the nation’s youngest citizens, the U.S. entry into World War I deep-
ened, rather than healed, existing cleavages within American society.
CONCLUS ION
The historian Joseph Hawes once said that childhood is “the place where we can catch a
culture in high relief.”44 This is especially true of war, which gives historians access to
the lives of children that peacetime rarely offers. Though far removed from the fighting,
American children and youths of various ages were called upon to contribute to the war
effort in ways small and large. In reflecting on these contributions, we can find traces of
an intergenerational tug-of-war over the meaning of childhood that played out simulta-
neously to the actual war. Children were two things—undervalued historical actors
and a cultural lens through which societies viewed themselves and others. At the very
least, historians should note that children were actively engaged in the construction of
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their childhoods, and that the boundaries of what it meant to grow up in times of war were
drawn and redrawn through dynamic, contested, and locally specific exchanges involv-
ing young and old people alike. Just as the lives of children were diverse, childhood never
existed in the singular. More than victims, children and youths were seen as future citi-
zens, as future defenders, as one of the objects about which wars were fought, and as one
of the resources for fighting them.
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